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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(h)(2015).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 (2010), Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(h)(2015), Utah Code
Ann.§ 30-3-10.9(9), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7G)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7(f)(2),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24, (a)(5)(A), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24,
(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24, (g)(5)(B).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The parties in this action were married on August 15, 1997 and divorced on the 8th day of
July, 2004. A son, M.P.B., was born as issue of the marriage and he was born on the 20 th day of
July, 2002.
When the parties divorced, Kirsteen Markel, Petitioner, M.P.B. 's mother, was awarded
custody and statutory parent time was awarded to the father, Respondent, Michael Phillip Blocker.
Following the divorce, multiple filings and pleadings were filed by both parties with a range
of allegations primarily related to the appropriate care and parent time of the minor child.
Ultimately, Blocker filed a Modification for a change of custody. After a three-day trial in which
Morkel, because of limited resources, represented herself, the court transferred custody of the
minor child from the mother Markel to the father Blocker. Although the trial court specifically
recognized that Markel did not have the financial ability to continue paying for supervised parent
time, the court order nevertheless immediately burdened Markel with a condition of unsupervised
parent time that required verification of her participation in individual therapy, required joint
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therapy with the minor child and the child's therapist, and required her retention of a Special
Master. The cost of the Special Master was prohibitive to Merkel, and, at various times, Merkel
was deprived of parent time at the direction of the Special Master and, at one point, parent time was
terminated altogether, and then subsequently re-instated. On one occasion, the Special Master
informed Merkel that her parent time could be increased as soon as she was brought current on her
child support obligations. The Special Master facially exceeded the authority of the Order
appointing the Special Master, wherein it states that the Special Master did not have the authority
to make any orders which substantially decreased or increased a parents time more than eight nights
per month. The termination of parent time, albeit temporarily, violated this provision of the Special
Master order. Further, conditioning increased parent time upon Markel bringing child support
current obviates Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-10.9(9), which specifically prohibits a denial ofparent time
because the non-custodial parent is not current on child support.
In addition to the costs above, Markel ended up having to pay additional costs to Academy
for Child Advocacy and Family Support (hereafter "ACAFS"), an agency that was to initially
oversee the transition of pick up and delivery of the minor child and then to oversee supervised
parent time. This cost was to be divided equally between Markel and Blocker but Blocker never
paid his one-half cost of the exchanges.
As part of the order changing custody, there was a recommendation from the Court that
Kelly Peterson not be appointed as Guardian ad Litem. The Guardian ad Litem' s office disregarded
the recommendation of the court and Kelly Peterson was appointed. Markel opposed Kelly
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Peterson being appointed because of her belief that Mr. Peterson was clearly biased in all of his
recommendations, including initiating actions against Markel that exceeded his authority of
representing the best interest of the minor child.
Because of the claimed excesses· of the Special Master, the Guardian ad Litem, and the
judge in allowing a disregard of his recommendation as to Kelly Peterson, Morkel filed a federal
lawsuit against these parties and the opposing counsel. Although the lawsuit ultimately was
dismissed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, it was not dismissed because the claimed actions
were non-meritorious, as claimed by Blocker in his Statement of Facts. They were dismissed
because the appropriate remedy was a state court action, not an action in federal court, since state
court remedies had not been exhausted. The federal case was dismissed without prejudice.
Because of their being defendants in the federal lawsuit, the trial judge recused himself and
Peterson, the Special Master and opposing counsel withdrew. The new trial judge, after a slew of
motions filed by both parties, ordered a home study, and selected one of three psychologists offered
by Merkel because no psychologists were offered, initially, by Blocker. Only after the psychologist
was selected by the court did Blocker offer his own.
A home study was completed and submitted to the court. Based on the home study, the court
ended supervised parent time. Multiple objections were filed by Blocker, who claimed lack of
notice and lack of opportunity to cross examine the preparer of the home study. The court allowed
Blocker, at every hearing, to make his arguments, until the court made its decision. Blocker was
offered the opportunity to cross examine the preparer of the home study, but declined.
Blocker was given ample opportunity to prepare and argue his case, produce witnesses,
3

cross examine the court appointed home study evaluator but Blocker declined, claiming, among
other things, a denial of due process, the court acted in violation of case precedent, and general
unfairness by the court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Blocker's Statement of facts is disputed. Further, they are not supported by citations to
the record and should be stricken. Morkel moves, in accordance with Ut. R. Appellate Procedure,
Rule 24(k) to strike his pleadings because of the failure to make any record citations (Rule 24
(a)(9)), the failure to cite as to where the issue raised by Blocker was preserved in the record (Rule
24(a)(5)(A)), and for the numerous scandalous, irrelevant and immaterial matters threaded
throughout his entire brief. Attorney's fees are also requested. Blocker's Statement of Facts are as
follows.
Morkel's Statement of Facts are as follows.
Kirsteen

Blocker Morkel (hereafter "Morkel"), Petitioner, and Michael P. Blocker

(hereafter "Blocker") Respondent, were married on August 15, 1997(Record 7; Record will
hereinafter be referred to as "R") and divorced on or about the 8th day of July, 2004.( R. 312). Their
marriage resulted in the birth of one child, M.P.B., who was born on the 20 th day of July, 2002 (
R. 7), and is currently 13 years old. Custody was joint, with primary care and residence given to
Morkel and statutory parent time awarded to Blocker ( R. 312, para. 12, 13). Virtually all of the
disputes that have come before the court in the last 13 years relate to the minor child.
A trial for a change ofcustody, inter alia, was held before the Honorable Lynn W. Davis on
the 24th, 25th and 27th day of August, 2009.( R.4389-4397). Close in time to the trial, Plaintiffs
4

[Morkel' s] attorney withdrew from the case, having charged Plaintiff more than $100,000, leaving
Plaintiff in the unenviable position of proceeding prose. ( R. 5649, paragraph 18). She soon after
retained Grant W. P. ("Bill") Morrison who had a conflict with the trial dates and sought a
continuance from Judge Davis. Mr. Morrison argued for a continuance from Judge Davis so that
Morkel would not have to appear prose. ( R. 5649). Judge Davis denied Morrison's request for a
continuance and Morkel was compelled to go to trial unrepresented ( R. 4387, 4389-4397). The
trial went forward as scheduled, and Merkel represented herself in the three day trial ( R. 43894397).
At the conclusion of the trial, the Respondent was ordered to prepare the findings and order
of the court. An objection by Morkel was filed citing specific errors by the Respondent in preparing
the findings and order ( R. 4757-4798). Blocker filed a Reply ( R. 4809-4843). The court heard
oral argument on December 14, 2009, took the matter under advisement and indicated that the court
itself would issue the final order. ( R. 4903).
On February 22, 2010 Judge Davis issued Findings of Fact, Order and Judgment ( R. 4978).
Sole custody was given to Blocker and the court "shall permit Kirsteen Morkel unsupervised
parent-time consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35, upon verification of her participation in
individual therapy, joint therapy with Mackay and Dr. Thom, and her retention of a Special
Master... " ( R. 4978, para. 12).
The Court pointed out in its Findings that "Kirsteen Markel does not have the financial
ability to continue paying for supervised parent-time" ( R. 4978; paragraph 19 Findings), " ... at this
time an exclusively supervised recommendation is not practical due to finances and would therefore,
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interfere with her relationship with her son... ", "the court finds that, at this time, Kirsteen Markel
does not have the financial ability to pay attorney's fees" ( R. 4973, para. 3 l)and, finally, "Because
of the parties' inability to pay, the court awards no fees to the Office of the Guardian ad Litem" (
R. 4969, para. 57).
Morkel did not have the financial ability to pay for individual therapy, joint therapy with
minor son Mackay and Dr. Thom, nor to pay for the continuing services of the Special Master, but
it was ordered nevertheless ( R. 4978). She ultimately paid over $10,000 in costs for supervision
( R. 5753, para. 17) as well as incur over $100,000 in legal fees immediately prior to trial®. 5649,
para. 18, which were to be paid through a benefactor). Blocker compounded the problem by not
paying his one-half of the cost of the exchanges at ACAFS ( R. 5753, para. 16).
Although the court had concerns about Morkel's ability to pay, the court subsequently
changed the order that Morkel, after paying the entire initial retainer of the Special Master, that
"thereafter each party would pay 50%". Upon review of the transcription of the court's hearing
setting forth the order of February 22, 2010, the court changed the order to Morkel having to pay
the entirety of the fees of the Special Master ( R.5391, para. 12). Also, as part of the court order,
the Court recommended that Kelly Peterson not be appointed as Guardian ad Litem ( R.5388,
para. 14). Kelly Peterson objected to the recommendation of the court and assumed the position of
Guardian ad Litem. ( R. 5385). The court allowed Mr. Peterson to be the Guardian ad Litem, even
against its own recommendation.
The Special Master Order of October 1, 2009 set forth the authority and limitation of the
Special Master. In particular, paragraph l(d) stated, "Sandra Dredge shall not have authority to
6
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make any orders which substantially (ordinarily defined as increasing or decreasing a parent's time
more than eight nights per month) alter the parties' time-sharing arrangements, alter an award of
physical custody, alter an award of legal custody, or substantially interfere with a party's contact
with his/her children" ( Special Master Order, R. 4699-4708).
There were stretches of time when Morkel was simply denied parent time by the Special
Master in direct contravention of the order of the court that specifically denied the Special Master
that authority. These "orders" by the Special Master were financially driven or driven by a Special
Master Order that, on its face, exceeded the authority of the Special Master.
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Ultimately, the Special Master resigned and was released ( R. 5687), the Guardian ad
Litem withdrew and was released ( R. 5682)and Judge Davis recused himself ( R. 5662).

2

Although paragraph 1 (d) of the Special Master Order of October 1, 2009, provided,
as reflected above, that " Sandra N. Dredge shall not have authority to make any orders which
substantially (ordinarily defined as increasing or decreasing a parent's time more than eight
nights per month) alter the parties' time-sharing arrangements, alter an award of physical
custody, alter an award oflegal custody, or substantially interfere with a party's contact with
his/her children", this occurred on a number of occasions. For example, the Order of the Special
Master dated 2-9-10, ( R. 5769) stated "Due to the escalating and serious events that have taken
place during parent time exchanges, Kirsteen's parent time with Mackay is temporarily
suspended until further notice. This means that Kirsteen is not to have any contact with Mackay
until further Order of the Special Master and/or Order of the Court". Also, "Again, until parent
time is reinstated by the Special Master or the Court, Kirsteen is not to have any contact with
Mackay outside of therapy. Therefore, no phone visitation or contact with Mackay at his school,
church, etc., is to take place until further ordered". The Special Master's Order, itself, clearly
limited the authority of the Special Master so that the Special Master could not alter a parent's
time more than eight nights per month. This order ended parent time, albeit "temporarily". Ms.
Dredge routinely violated this order, including suspending, at one point, parent time altogether
( R. 5769) and in a further draconian action eliminated any contact by phone or school or
church.
2

The withdrawals of the Special Master, the Guardian ad Litem, opposing counsel and
the judge were predicated primarily on the filing of a federal lawsuit against them, which was
7
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After a multitude of pleadings, motions,

argument and appearances of the parties, the

Court, in a hearing on April 16, 2014, reinstated visitation consistent with the statutory guidelines
established at Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35, on a temporary basis for ninety days, on the
condition the visitation would be conducted through a mutually agreed upon party. Justin W. Day
was selected by the parties. ( R. 5949, para. 1). There was also a home study ordered ( R. 5949,
para. 3). Additionally, it was ordered that the Petitioner's previously filed Motion to Show Cause
@

(actually, Motion to Clarify or Modify Custody Order, R. 5706), seeking a restoration of statutory
parent time, would be deemed a Petition to Modify, and the Court waived any filing fees . ( R.
5949).
After another flurry of motions were filed by Blocker, including: a Rule 60(a) Motion for
Relieffrom Order,®. 5973); a Revised Order,®. 5970); and a Motion Objecting to Petitioner's List
of Proposed Evaluators. ®. 5976). The Court, on May 12, 2014, executed the Revised Order
submitted by Blocker. ( R.5995). With minor expansions (supervised visitation would also include

ultimately dismissed (without prejudice) because (1) the application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred the claims in federal court and, (2) the application of the Younger doctrine
mandated dismissal. Rooker-Feldman prohibits a losing party in state court from seeking what
in substance would be a review of the state judgment in federal court based on the losing party's
claim that the state judgment itself violates the losing party's federal rights. The court noted that
this doctrine has a narrow application and applies only when a state court judgment is final. The
court stated the judgment was not final here because the state-court proceedings were ongoing
when Markel brought suit in federal court. The court held that the district court therefore erred
when it dismissed the case under this doctrine. The Younger doctrine mandates an abstention
from exercising jurisdiction when 3 conditions are met: (l)there are ongoing state proceedings,
(2) the state court offers an adequate forum to hear the plaintiffs claims and (3) the state
proceedings involve important state interests. The court found all conditions were met and
upheld the dismissal of Morkel's claims on this ground. ( R. 6090-6086). As to the damages
claim, the 10th Circuit Court upheld the district court's dismissal for the damages portion
because all of the defendants were covered under immunity. ( R.6085).
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Justin Day's wife if Justin was out for short periods of time, etc.)®. 5993-5994) the order
maintained its basic premise. A status conference was set for August 1, 2014.
In the Minute Entry of June 30, 2014, because the parties were unable to agree on a home
study evaluator, the Court selected Vickie D. Burgess, Ph.D. Dr. Burgess submitted a home study
evaluation to the court on July 21, 2014. ( R. 6010). The report recommended unsupervised
visitation with mother Kirsteen Blocker. ( R. 6001 ).
On August 1, 2014, the matter came before the court on a status conference and based on
the report of Dr. Burgess, the court struck supervised parent time. An evidentiary hearing on
custody evaluation was set for Oct. 14, 2014. ( R.6011, 6035).
The Court signed the order on the August 1, 2014 hearing on August 22, 2014. The order
allowed a modification of the Court's February 22, 2010 order and specifically made a "temporary
modification to the conditions of parent time .... ". ( R.6033; also, see Minute Entry Regarding the
Order for Hearing of August 1, 2014 and Motion of Counsel to Withdraw; R.6011).

The

modification was a simple restoration of statutory parent time. In other words, the non-custodial
parent Morkel could have parent time with her son every other weekend, from 7:00 p.m. Friday
night, through Sunday night at 7:00 p.m. as well as every other holiday and an equal division of the
summertime and Christmas and Spring breaks (See Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-35) and the parent time
was to be unsupervised.
Although the court struck supervised visitation with this order, it also instructed the parties
to "exchange a complete list of witnesses and exhibits three weeks prior to the next hearing" and
set a new hearing for October 14, 2014 ( R. 6011).
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Blocker filed an Objection to Proposed Order and to the Order of the Court made on August
1, 2014 ( R. 6025) and proposed a Revised Order for August 1, 2014 Status Conference ( R. 6023).
The court reviewed both proposed orders " ... and is satisfied that the order proposed by the
petitioner more accurately reflects the intent of the court on August 1. The Court will, therefore,
electronically sign the proposed order" ( R. 6036).
Blocker then filed a two hundred eleven page Respondent's Exhibits ( R. 6052-6263) in
(?\
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anticipation of the Oct. 14, 2014 hearing. Markel filed a one page Exhibit designation which
referenced only the report of Dr. Victoria Burgess ( R. 6051 ).
Blocker, again, filed several motions, including a Renewed Motion to Strike Petition to
Modify Custody Order ( R. 6270), and a Motion to Strike Visitation of Victoria Burgess, Ph.D. and
to Appoint Dr. Harold Blakelock or Dr. Matthew Davies or Dr. Jay Jensen as New Evaluator ( R.
6276). These were opposed by Markel ( R.6282, 6286) and in a motion entitled Opposition to
Respondent's Renewed Motion to Strike Petition to Modify Custody Order, ( R. 6282) referenced
the current state of the law regarding supervised custody. The motion pointed out that the Utah
legislature had made it abundantly clear that "supervision is to only be imposed in rare
circumstances and when it was established that 'the child would be subject to physical or emotional
harm or child abuse ... " and cited Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-34.5(1)(2014) ( R. 6281).
Meanwhile, an attomey for Blocker, Janet G. Peterson, entered a Limited Appearance for
the purpose of continuing the October 14, 2014 hearing ( R. 6278). When the hearing was
continued without date, she withdrew ( R. 6306).
The Court, on April 13, 2015, set oral argument for June 10, 2015 ( R. 6303) on all pending
10

motions.
On June 10, 2015, the Court heard oral argument. The Court ruled that the order made a
year before was to be the final order of the court. ( R. 6307, Minute Entry Order). The order
submitted by Markel and signed by the Court stated, "It is hereby ordered that the court's
provisional ruling, entered on Aug. 22, 2014, which Order granted the Petitioner's Petition to
Modify on a temporary basis providing for the Petitioner's right to visitation consistent with the
statutory minimum, SHALL BE MADE PERMANENT. Therefore, the Petition to Modify is
GRANTED as follows:
1. Petitioner shall have the right to visitation with
her minor son in a manner consistent with the guidelines and statutory minimums as established at
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-35.
2. Each party was to bear their own costs and attorney fees."
The order was signed by the Court on July 6, 2015. Blocker objected to the Petitioner's order but
rather than waiting for the previously scheduled evidentiary hearing, where he could examine
witnesses, have his own witnesses testify, introduce exhibits and argue against Dr. Burgess's
report, he asked that this hearing be continued, which was granted. He then, prior to
the hearing, filed this appeal.
ARGUMENT I

BLOCKER ARGUES THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
STATE ANY FINDINGS THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MATERIAL CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES TO WARRANT CHANGING SUPERVISED VISITATION TO
UNSUPERVISED VISITATION BUT DOES NOT INDICATE WHERE IN THE RECORD IDS
ISSUE IS PRESERVED NOR DOES HE MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE OR CITE TO THE
RECORD. THUS, THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE
ARGUMENTS AND ACCEPT THE COURT'S RULlNG AS VALID.
IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT BLOCKER'S ARGUMENT.
11

1. Blocker's claim of no findings and no material change of circumstances.

In a blanket statement, Blocker's first issue on appeal is that the trial court failed to make
any findings that there had been a material change of circumstances to warrant changing supervised
parent time to unsupervised parent time. In the substance of the argument, Blocker simply states
that the court must make a specific finding in its order showing there had been a material change
in circumstances before it granted a Petition to Modify Custody. Blocker fails to cite where his
issue is preserved by the record, nor are there any record citations or any attempt at marshaling
evidence.
Ut. R. Appellate Procedure 24, Briefs, (a)(7)requires, among other things, that "All
statements of fact and reference to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the
record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." Paragraph (e) states, "References in briefs
to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant
to Rule 11 (b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement
prepared pursuant to Rule ll(f) or 11 (g)." Further, (a)(9) requires, in pertinent part, that the
Appellant must, in the argument section of the brief, first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding.
Blocker cites only to the limited and unpaginated documents attached to his addendum.
Blocker utterly fails to confom1 to the requirement of record citations, or where issues were
preserved at the trial court level, or to marshal evidence that supports the Court's ruling.

An

appealing party has a duty to "marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the
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clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous". Lefavi v. Bertoch, 994 P .2d 817,
821 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961P2305, 312 (Utah 1998) (quoting
In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah Ct. App 1989).
When a party fails to marshal the evidence in support of the challenged findings, this Court
"refuse[s] to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept[s] the findings as valid."
Lefavi, at 821 (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, 872 P.2d 1051, 1053
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quotingMountain States Broadcasting Co. V. Neale, 783 P.2d551, 553 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).)
This Court should refuse to consider the merits of Blocker's challenge and accept the Trial
Court's Order and decision as valid.

2.

In the alternative, Blocker's arguments are not well taken. Contrary to Blocker's

representation that no findings were made, they in fact were, encompassed within this order and
prior orders issued by the court.
Without regurgitating the Statement of Facts encompassing the prior eleven years, suffice
it to say that originally custody of the minor child resided with Morkel, as culled from the divorce
decree of July 8, 2004. Custody was changed to Blocker by order of Judge Davis on February 22,
2010, and laid out conditions that were to be satisfied for unsupervised parent time. Supervised
visitation was subsequently imposed, with attendant motions and hearings but were lifted on August
1, 2014, following a recommendation by a home evaluator.
The order was reduced to writing on August 22, 2014, and the supervised parent time
changed to unsupervised. Although the written order did not fully incorporate specific findings,
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the trial judge was on the front line with numerous motions initiated by Markel' s Motion for an
Order to Show Cause which the Court sua sponte changed to a Petition to Modify. There followed
a blizzard of competing motions and arguments that resulted in a period of supervision of Merkel
during her parent time, by a party stipulated to by both Blocker and Morkel. .
The Court also required a home study evaluator and set deadlines. Based on the home study
evaluation the court recommended that Merkel did not need supervision and the court ordered
there would be no further supervision. The Court considered the recommendation of the evaluator
as reflected in its Minute Status Conference ruling of August 1, 2014, which stated "Based on the
report received by the Court, the Court strikes supervised visitation at this time", and also the
order of August 22, 2014, further considered "briefing [by the parties], the argument of counsel
and otherwise being fully informed in this matter" (which presumably included that there were no
problems during the entire period from August 1, 2014 to the execution of the Order Modifying
Custody Order of July 6, 2016, a period of almost a year and the current status of the law disfavoring
supervised parent time except in rare circumstances (see R. 6281) and issued its order simply
restoring unsupervised statutory minimum visitation. This was a material and substantial change
of circumstances since it changed the prior requirement of supervision to no supervision. Although
not specifically addressing findings per se, nevertheless these were findings incorporated by the
trial court in its actions and followed by the parties. Finally, the best interests of the minor child
were implicitly found by the Court, and hinged its "no supervision" order on the recommendation
of the home study evaluator.
The Utah Supreme Court has accorded broad discretion to the Court in activities of this
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nature. In detem1ining pennanent physical custody of a minor child, trial judges are accorded
broad discretion. See Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (referencing Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647,
648 (Utah 1988); Moody v. Moody. 715 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985). "Only where the trial court's
judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion, will [an appellate court] interpose
its own judgment". Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197,201 (Utah 1985).
In the case at bar, there was a complete failure by Blocker to marshal any type of evidence

as to why the trial court's judgment was so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion. There
was a claim of a purported failure by the trial court to show a material change of circumstances or
make findings yet there clearly was a change of supervised parent time to unsupervised parent time,
that prevailed for almost a year without impediment or difficulty. If the protection of the children
provided by supervised visitation is no longer necessary, either because the allegations that
necessitated the supervision are determined to be without 'credible evidence' or because the
noncustodial parent had demonstrated a clear ability to control the propensities which necessitated
the supervision, the circuit court should gradually diminish the degree of supervision required with
the ultimate goal of providing unsupervised visitation. Carterv. Carter, 470 S.E. 2d 193,200(1996).
As to either alternative, i.e., that Blocker has not complied in the least degree with the
requirements of marshaling evidence, illustrating preservation of issues at the trial court level or
citing to the record or failed, alternatively, to show abuse of discretion, the lower court order
should be affirmed and attorney's fees awarded.
ARGUMENT II

BLOCKER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRJALCOURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
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MORKEL'S INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS FOR HER UNSUPERVISED
PARENT TIME CONSTITUTED A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES UPON
WHICH TO BASE A MODIFICATION OF A CUSTODY AWARD FAILS FOR WANT OF
RECORDCITATIONORCITATIONTOPRESERVATIONOFTHEEVIDENCEMAKINGTHIS
ISSUE IMPOSSIBLE IN WHICH TO RESPOND AND THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
There is no evidence provided by Blocker that shows the Court held that Morkel' s inability
to comply with conditions for her unsupervised parent time constituted a material change in
circumstances upon which to base a modification of a custody award. It is fundamental to Blocker's
argument that the judge held, somewhere in the 54 hearings he claims in his brief, that this holding
exists. It would have been a simple matter to cite to the record or provide, even, a copy of the
purported order in his addendum. There is no record citation or preservation of the record that
indicates that the trial judge ever made this ruling. In fact, the only evidence offered by Blocker,
attached in his addendum, is the Order Modifying Custody Order which alludes to the court
considering briefing, argument of counsel and otherwise being informed in the matter. This order
doesn't say what Blocker says it says.

However, it does allude to the opposite, i.e., that the

provisional order of the court, entered on Aug. 22, 2014, which provided on a temporary basis the
Petitioner's (Morkel) right to visitation consistent with the statutory minimum SHALL BE MADE
PERMANENT (capitalization the Courts).
The only conclusion that can be drawn was that the unsupervised parent time was
successful and thus, the provisional order became pem1anent. The unsupported statement that the
court "decided that Morkel's inability to comply with conditions for her unsupervised parent time
constituted a material change in circumstances upon which to base a modification of a custody
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award" is a fraud on the court.
In addition to the misrepresentation by Blocker of a purported court order that never
existed, the further difficulty in attempting to mount a response to Blocker's claims that "The trial
court erred when it decided that Morkel's inability to comply with conditions for her
unsupervised parent time constituted a material change in circumstances upon which to base a
modification of a custody award" is the complete absence of citations to the record. References
to Dr. Kirk Thom, Dr. Matthew Davies, Special Master Sandra Dredge and Guardian ad Litem
Kelly Peterson are nonexistent in record citations. Blocker makes arguments relating to Thom,
Davies, Dredge and Peterson but there are simply no record citations in support of the purported
statements of these people. Markel has made an exhaustive record citation in her Statement of
Facts, and Blocker has completely failed in any citations to the record in support of his arguments.
Markel is entitled to rely on the recommendation of the home study evaluator who stated there was
no further need of supervised parent time. She is entitled to rely on the Court's order accepting the
recommendation. Both the report and the orders of the court are specifically cited to the record by
Merkel. Part of that record citation was that the prior recommendations of other evaluators were
essentially, stale dated, in that they were over 5 years old and no longer pertinent. Yet, Blocker
continues to refer to them in this argument without any type of record citation.
This Court should refuse to consider the merits of the claims set forth in Blocker's second
argument and award attorneys fees and costs to Markel for the misrepresentation of a court order
and failing to abide by the requirements set forth in the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
17

ARGUMENT ill

BLOCKER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRJAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SIGNED
THE ORDER DRAFTED BY MORKEL'S COUNSEL A MERE THREE DAYS AFTER IT
WAS SUBMITTED (WHEN THOSE DAYS INCLUDED A LEGAL HOLIDAY AND A
WEEKEND) WHEN MORK.EL'S COUNSEL HAD NOT SERVED IT ON BLOCKER AND
WHEN BLOCKER WAS NOT GIVEN THE PROPER TIME TO FILE AN OBJECTION BUT DID
FILE A TIMELY OBJECTION ONCE HE, ON HIS OWN, FOUND OUT ABOUT THE
EXISTENCE OF THE ORDER FAILS FOR WANT OF RECORD CITATION AND CITE
THAT THE ISSUE WAS PRESERVED AT TRIAL; IT ALSO FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW
Again, there is no record citation and no indication this issue was preserved at the trial level.
Irrespective of the failure of Blocker to follow the rules of appellate procedure, he is also incorrect
as a matter of law. Assuming arguendo that the trial judge did sign the order "a mere three days
after it was submitted", the trial judge is not bound by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Although
Blocker references Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 70)(2), that rule used to be Rule 7(f)(2). 3 That
rule contemplates that within 14 days of being directed by the court to prepare a proposed order
confirming the court's decision, a party must serve the proposed order on the other parties for
review and approval as to form. Rule 7(t)(2) (now 70)(2)) does not limit the district court's
discretion to enter judgments and orders. See Henshaw v. Estate of King. 2007 UT App 378, § 25,
173 P.3d 876. "To the contrary, Utah case law indicates that the rules pertaining to the entry of
proposed judgments and orders are binding only on the litigants and not on the trial court." In
particular, rule 7(t)(2) "places no restrictions on when a trial court may sign a proposed judgment
or order". Id. The new rule 7G)(2), which is the old 7(t)(2), governs the actions oflitigants and not
those of the district court. Thus, the election of the district court to execute the order three days

3

Rule 7 Advisory Committee Notes references the 2015 changes to Rule 7. See
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules. urcp/urcp007 .note.html
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after it being submitted does not violate the requirements of that rule. This applies equally to the
other subsections of Rule 7 referenced by Blocker because the argument, supra, is the same.
Blocker claims he did not receive any notice of the Order (presumed to be Order Modifying
Custody Order, since that is the only order attached to his addendum). That order clearly has a
Certificate of Service, electronically executed by attorney Wesley D. Felix, that on the 25 th day of
June, 2015 he "caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER
TEMPORARILY MODIFYING CUSTODY ORDER AND SETTING ADDITIONAL MATTERS
FOR HEARING WITHIN 90 DAYS to be served via the Court's electronic filing system upon all
of counsel of record and by mail to the Respondent Michael P. Blocker. This is certified to
by the signing attorney Wesley D. Felix.
Oddly, although Blocker complains he never received service of the order, the second
document attached to Blocker's addendum, Motion Objecting to Petitioner's Order of June 10,
2015, is unsigned by Blocker and has a proposed date that is blank but states "DATED this _ _ day
of May, 2014." Further, he has a Certificate of Service that includes this statement: "I certify that
on this _ _ day of May, 2014, I have mailed first-class postage prepaid a copy of this motion to
Petitioner's attorney" and lists Wesley D. Felix, but both the Motion and Certificate are unsigned.
The date of May, 2014 cannot possibly be the month that Blocker purportedly filed his Motion
since the first sentence of the first page states, MICHAEL BLOCKER RESPONDS TO
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED "ORDER MODIFYING CUSTODY" of June 10, 2015 AS
FOLLOWS:" Irrespective, this is the evidence submitted by Blocker.
Blocker's argument on Argument III three fails for three reasons. First, there is no citation
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to the record or any proof this issue was preseived at trial. Second, even the evidence submitted
by Blocker that is not a record citation but an attachment to his addendum, indicates a Certificate
of Mailing was signed by Morkel's trial attorney certifying he sent Blocker a copy of the proposed
order. He also submits what is apparently a phony Motion since the dates do not match. Third, it
fails as a matter of law.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed and attorney's fees and costs awarded to
Morkel.

ARGUMENT IV
BLOCKER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DEPRIVED
BLOCKER OF
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY REFUSING TO ALLOW HIM TO ARGUE
HIS MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY DURING THE HEARING
AND INSTEAD MERELY STATED THAT HE HAD MADE
DECISION AND WAS GOING
TO GRANT THE PETITION, THE JUDGE SIGNED THE ORDER WITHOUT NOTIFYING
BLOCKER AND NEVER SENT A COPY OF THE ORDER TO BLOCKER, FAILED TO ACT ON
TWO PRO PERLYNOTICED AND SUBMITTED MOTIONS THAT WERE NOT OBJECTED TO
FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, AND WHEN THE JUDGE CHANGED A STATUS
CONFERENCEINTOANEVIDENTIARYHEARINGWITHOUTNOTICEANDDIDNOTGIVE
BLOCKER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE OR REBUT MORK.EL'S WITNESSES IS
COMPOUND, TENUOUS AND UNSUPPORTED BY ANY RECORD CITATIONS OR
REFERENCES TO WHERE THE ISSUES WERE PRESERVED AT TRIAL; FURTHER, THE
RECORD IN THE ADDENDUMS DOES NOT SUPPORT BLOCKER'S ALLEGATIONS

ms

ms

There are no record citations nor references to the record to show where the issues alleged
above were preserved at the trial level. The only evidence provided by Blocker is the addendum,
annexed to his Brief. Markel will address that evidence, even though it is not cited to the record.
1. Due process denial

First, as to Blocker's claim that he was denied due process because he claims the court
denied him the right to argue his motion to dismiss Petitioner's modify during the hearing and
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instead merely stated he was going to grant the Petition.
Blocker misrepresents what occurred. He has attached a copy of the transcript and it belies
his arguments he was denied due process because the court denied him the right to argue his
motion to dismiss. The transcript states, in pertinent part relating to Blocker:
THE COURT: Mr. Blocker, why don't you go first. (Page 2, line 25).
THE COURT: You can speak from there. (Page 3, lines 6-11).
THE COURT: Mr. Blocker, what is it that you seek? (Page 5, lines 20-21)
THE COURT: I want to hear you tell me why I should make a change. Why is the present
status quo not best for your child?
(Page 6, lines 11-13).
MR. BLOCKER: Your honor, with all due respect, we were called in for a certain reason.
I was prepared for that. If you want me to address that, I will ...
THE COURT: I do.
The colloquy between Blocker and the court goes from the top of page 6 through line 23,
page 7 through page 9. The court makes a finding, though, on page 8, lines 17 through 21 which
states "What we've got is a 12, soon to be 13 year old young man. His dad has sole legal and
physical custody right now. Temporary, permanent, whatever, that's what he has. Mom has
statutory visitation without supervision. That has been in place since I ordered that about a year
ago" .... " I think I'm inclined, as far as I'm concerned to treat that as a permanent state of affairs
right now" .. Now, if either wants to petition to change things, then I'm going to require a renewed
petition to modify. We will litigate that in the nom1al and ordinary course .... that's what I'm
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inclined to do, Mr. Blocker".
Mr. BLOCKER: Yes, I would like to express on the record that I strenuously object with that
for the following- (Page 9, lines 8-9).
THE COURT: That's fine. (Page 9, line 10)
The rest of the colloquy is from page 9, lines 11 through 22.
Mr. BlOCKER:-for the following reasons.
THE COURT: Overruled. That's what I'm doing.
Mr. BLOCKER: Okay, may I state the law regarding this?
THE COURT: No, I'm familiar with the law. That's my ruling.
MR. BLOCKER: Hogue v. Hogue, you 're familiar with that?
THE COURT: Mr. Blocker, that's my ruling. I have wide discretion in these matters, and
I act from what I perceive to be in the best interest of the child.
MR. BLOCKER: But the law says that we can't...
THE COURT: Mr. Blocker, I don't intend to argue with you. That's my ruling.
There was another tete a tete between the Court and Blocker at 11, line 6 through line 24.
Although Blocker didn't like it, the Court provided ample opportunity for Blocker to argue
his case.
2. Failure by the court to send Blocker a copy of the Order or to notify Blocker that the court
had signed the order.
Nowhere does Blocker cite law that the Comt is required to send Blocker a copy of the order
or to notify Blocker that the court had executed an order. (See Morkel's response to Blocker's third
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argument).

3. The Court failed to act on two motions for a period of over six months.
Blocker does not cite any law that the court is required to act on a motion within a certain
period of time. Indeed, the record reflects that the judge prior to Judge Taylor never responded, at
all, to the motion to remove the Guardian ad Litem, Kelly Peterson.

4. The judge changed the status conference into an evidentiary hearing without notice and did
not give Blocker an opportunity to prepare or rebut Morkel's witness.
There is no reference to the record or even at which hearing the court changed the status
conference into an evidentiary hearing but it is supposed that this claim by Blocker references the
August 1, 2014 transcript attached to his addendum.
The hearing set for August 1, 2014 was set as a status conference.(T. Page 2, line 5).
However, Blocker, at the hearing, stated he was going to enter a motion to strike the visitation
report by Dr. Burgess and ask to appoint another evaluator. (T. Page 2 lines 15-18). He was given
the chance by the court, because of his motion, to examine Dr. Burgess at the hearing. (T. Page 3,
line 15). As soon as he objected and wanted a hearing to address the entire valuation (T. Page 3,
lines 21-24) the Court stated "Well, we can go that way if you want." (T. Page 3, line 25). The
Court also commented that Blocker had the opportunity to provide a counter expert, but didn't.(T.
Page 4, lines 2-3).
A fair reading of this transcript is that the Court set the matter for hearing to allow further
testimony (T. Page 4, lines 18-19) and set a hearing date for October 14, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. (T. Page

5, line 22).
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Blocker had the opportunity at the August 1, 2014 hearing to examine Dr. Burgess, who
had prepared the home study evaluation, but declined. The Court did not deprive Blocker the
opportunity to have a hearing on that very issue, but set one that day to allow Blocker the time he
said he needed. Blocker again misrepresents that he was denied due process and not given the
opportunity to call his own witnesses or present his case. The court clearly granted him that
opportunity as reflected by his own addendum record.
These multiple issues are without merit and the lower court decision should be affirmed and
attorneys fees and costs awarded to Morkel.

ARGUMENTV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONVERTED MORKEL'S ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE INTO A PETITION TO MODIFY WHEN MORK.EL HERSELF STATED ON THE
RECORD THAT SHEWAS NOT SEEKING A PETITION TO MODIFY BUT ONLY TO HAVE
THE COURT RULE ON WHO WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE EXISTING ORDER
Once again, Blocker does not cite to the record or to a preservation of this issue and the
lower court order should be affirmed on that basis alone. However, Blocker is also wrong as a
matter of law.
In a case similar to the current case, in a mother's petition to modify custody, the trial court
had the discretion under this rule to modify the parties' child support obligations despite mother's
failure to request such relief in her petition. Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App. 221 P.3d 888. Every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682
P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). See also Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah
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1984): Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P .2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
There are no record citations, nor preservation citations, and the lack thereof is sufficient
to warrant this Court affirming the lower courts order. With respect to this issue, it is also
incorrect as a matter of law.
The lower court holding should be affirmed and attorney's fees and costs awarded to
Morkel.
CONCLUSION

Blocker raises

five arguments, with additional arguments within some of the five

arguments. None are supported by any record citation or a citation of what issues may or may not
have been preserved, and where, at the trial level. There was no marshaling of evidence. None of
the requirements for filing an appeal have been adhered to by Blocker.
Blocker has made misrepresentations to the Court in support of his appeal. His appeal
contains multitudinous ad hominem arguments not worthy of a response and designed solely to
destroy the character of Morkel. Blocker attacks witnesses of Morkel but has no evidence in any
record citations. The only record provided by Blocker is his own addendum, which is not designed
to supplant the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Nevertheless, Morkel utilized these very records to
show that Blocker's arguments are lacking in merit and non-supportive of his allegations.
Judge Taylor recognized the need of allowing what appeared to be working, in the way of
unsupervised parent time with the minor child's mother, to be in the best interest of the minor
child. It appeared to the Court that this arrangement had worked for the prior year, and it worked
without any apparent problems.
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His order recognized the best interest of the minor child in maintaining the status quo.
The order of the lower court should be affirmed and attorney's fees and costs awarded to
Markel.
DATED this 22th day of February, 2016.
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